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Geocoding-protected health information using online services
may compromise patient privacy - Comments on “Evaluation
of the positional difference between two common geocoding
methods” by Duncan et al.
Dear Editor, 
I was very excited to read the paper by Duncan et al.
(2011), which described the locational accuracy and
ease of geocoding address information using online
geocoding services, published in Geospatial Health.
The authors produced a very thorough analysis high-
lighting the practical utility of Batchgeo, and they pro-
mote it as a free and powerful resource for geocoding
addresses. Unfortunately, they failed to recognize that
the use of online geocoding services such as Batchgeo
and ArcGIS Online World Geocoding Service (which
were used in their study) may have inadvertently dis-
closed protected health information to an external
organisation. 
Location of residence is identifiable information.
Passing address information to Batchgeo or other
online geocoding services jeopardizes patient privacy
because the information may be logged and stored in
their data servers. Batchgeo’s map data security and
privacy policy states that they may record information
such as your web request, Internet Protocol (IP)
address, and the date and time of the transaction
(2011). Static IP addresses are unique and identifiable,
and many websites such as Batchgeo use cookies to
track users for personalized marketing purposes.
Therefore, it is possible for an online geocoding serv-
ice provider to identify the organisation submitting the
geocode request and attribute the list of addresses it
processes. Furthermore, this information may be aug-
mented with the date of the geocode request and the
dataset in question may become reverse identifiable. 
Recognizing the sensitivity of health and finance
data, and the requirement to keep the information pri-
vate and secured, ESRI (host of ArcGIS Online World
Geocoding Service) recommends that geocoding of
these data be performed using locally-stored reference
street address datasets behind a secure firewall (2011).
Online geocoding services should not be used for
geocoding-protected health information because
patient privacy may be compromised and the organi-
sation may be in violation of privacy legislation.
The intent of this letter is not to embarrass the
authors of the study, nor is it to vilify online geocoding
services (or to suggest that they may have malicious
intent to use the information that was inadvertently
disclosed to them). Instead, public health practitioners
and researchers should be aware that online geocoding
services should not be used on sensitive and protected
health datasets for the reasons stated above.
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Response to Geocoding-protected health information using
online services may compromise patient privacy - Comments
on “Evaluation of the positional difference between two com-
mon geocoding methods” by Duncan et al.
Dear Editor,
We thank Mak for his positive comments about
our article previously published in Geospatial
Health (Duncan et al., 2011), and for bringing atten-
tion to the important issue of potentially compro-
mising patient privacy (including protected health
information) when geocoding such data using online
services. We acknowledge that we did not discuss the
issue of confidentiality when geocoding data using
online services, and we appreciate the opportunity to
briefly reflect on this topic. Assurance in protecting
participants’ confidentiality is of the utmost impor-
tance, and special care should be given to geospatial
datasets with individual-level sensitive health infor-
mation. Accidental sharing of this information may
result in job discrimination, and social stigma, to
name a few. In this case, use of online geocoding
services can inadvertently disclose individual loca-
tion (and perhaps other) information to an external
organisation, since addresses are loaded onto an
external server. Even if data storage on the server is
temporary and anonymous there is still reason for
concern due to breached privacy. Therefore, the
nature of online geocoding services may not be suit-
able for projects with individual-level sensitive/con-
fidential data. 
Yet, it is worth mentioning that security proce-
dures are determined by the characteristics of the
research. In some projects, including the one dis-
cussed in our article, study participants are not
patients. Specific security procedures can be speci-
fied in a data management plan, approved by an
institution’s human subjects committee, and
described in the process of obtaining informed con-
sent from study participants. In some cases confi-
dentiality can be protected by using a large enough
geographic level. Indeed, there could be a certain
level of spatial aggregation suitable for online
geocoding. For instance, when geocoding is used to
find geographical coordinates for zip codes in a
dataset using online geocoding services may not
compromise study participants’ locations. The US
Census Bureau considers a census block as the small-
est spatial unit at which confidentiality of census
respondents can be preserved, but the scale and
nature of the data should determine if online geocod-
ing services are suitable or not. We cannot assume
that a census block is an adequate unit to protect
confidentiality of health data, since one needs to
consider several issues that could potentially facili-
tate the identification of subjects in the block (e.g.
the rarity of the health event, and the selectivity of
the disease by age group, race and gender). Common
sense and care from the researcher/practitioner is
absolutely crucial in deciding which services to
utilise for geocoding. 
We note that several methods to ensure confiden-
tiality in geocoding have been discussed previously,
including when using online geocoding services (such
as submitting randomised bundles of erroneous as
well as real data) (Gittler, 2008; Goldberg, 2008).
Also, it is worth noting that disclosure and confi-
dentiality agreements can and should be agreed upon
between the submitter of the data and the service
provider. We urge public health researchers and
practitioners to adapt existing policies, guidelines
and protocols for geocoding, develop new ones (as
needed), and effectively use them in order to ensure
confidentiality. This issue was discussed at the First
International Geospatial Geocoding Conference
(http://geocodingconference.com/) in December
2011. Given the increasing prominence of online
services in the future, we hope that new recommen-
dations will also address circumstances when one
should (or should not) use online geocoding. 
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